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Price Contracts, Output, and Monetary Disturbances
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simp1e example in which incomplete asset markets create
incentives for buyers and sellers to sign contracts that specify a price
function which differs from the spot market equilibrium price function. The
price function can exhibit downward stickiness in nominal prices, In the
sense that a fall in the money supply reduces nominal prices less than
proportionately and reduces real output. This equilibrium dominates spot
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I.Introduction
The notion that prices are somewhat sticky in a downward direction and
that output is determined by demand and not directly by supply playprominent
roles in "Keynesian' macroeconomics. Yet the rationale forsticky prices has
proved elusive. Indeed, the language of "sticky prices' is loaded: rather
than asking about the consequences of sticky prices, it would bebetter to
ask about the consequences of specific circumstances which leadpeople to
choose to trade at prices that have particular characteristics (orresponses
to exogenous disturbances).1 Many macroeconomic modelssimply assume that
prices are sticky without investigating the causes of that stickiness.
However, there are examples in which the same circumstances thatcause prices
to be sticky are known also to cause people to alter their other choices.
e.g. .aboutquantity-determination, in such a way as to change the
equilibrium.
2
One expects this to be a general phenomenon: if restrictionsare imposed
that prevent people from trading at certain prices, the restrictions also
motivate people to alter their behavior so as to minimize the effectson
their own welfare. People will choose to consume differentquantities of
other goods or leisure (as in the literature on "effective demand'). Ina
world of uncertainty, people will also choose different portfolios ofassets
1Having said this, I will revert to the usuallanguage in order to avoid
semantic disputes.
2See for example Barro(1976).2
in response to these restrictions, because the restrictions change the
probability distribution of the real returns to assets. Contractual
arrangements can be thought of as assets and subjected to asset-pricing
formulas. A desire to rationalize sticky prices and determine the effects of
various disturbances in their presence was one of the motivating forces
behind the development of the recent literature on contracts following Baily
(1974) and Azarladis (1975). Most of the literature on contracts, however.
employs real models In which money and nominal prices play no role.
This paper develops a model in which money plays a critical role in
transactions—using a cash-in-advance constraint4—and in which households
would like to insure against fluctuations in the real value of their nominal
money balances. But explicit insurance markets to accomplish this task are
unavailable. Contracts between buyers and sellers are shown to be a partial
substitute for these insurance markets. Specifically, the paper presents an
example with contracts that (a) specify nominal prices that do not vary in
proportion to changes In the money supply, (b) involve variations in output
when the money supply changes, and (c) dominate spot market equilibrum in
terms of households' expected utility. In the example, a fall in the money
supply produces a smaller percentage fall in nominal prices and a fall in
output. Though prices are, in that sense, partly sticky in a downward
direction, they are not sticky in an upward direction.
3Stiglitz (1984) provides a critical survey of that literature. Also see
Rosen (1985).
4See Clower (1967) and Lucas (1980). Kohn (1981) and (1984) surveys the
constraint from historical perspective and discusses the recent abundance of
research making use of the constraint.3
Section II of the paper presents the model and examines spot market
equilibrium. Section III discusses determination of output and prices under
the specified contracts and examines the effects of monetary disturbances.
Section IV contains some further comments.
LI. Spot MarketEiljbr1um ina_Simp_ netary Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of households indexed by their
point-of-origin along the (0, 1) Interval. Household move costlessly to
locations on the (1, 2) interval, where all trades take place. Each
household is a price-taker and maximizes discounted expected utility of
consumption and leisure over its two-period life,
(1)E[IJ(c) +W(l—L)+/3U(c)÷/3W(l—L')]
where c and c' are first- and second-period consumptions, and L and L' are




(2b) W(1 -L)= LI+R.
One unit of labor produced one unit of the consumption good. Workers never
consume their own output (perhaps because of social taboo or because of some4
physical impossibilities such as that of a person watching—live——a sporting
event in which he participates).I also assume that each seller has a
representative sample of the population as his customers.










money held at the beginning of the period, before transfers
lump-sum transfer payment of money received at the beginning
period
of (non-money) financial assets at the end of the period
of nominal prices of (non-money financial assets
of goods in period one
holdings at the end of period one
In addition to the budget
constraint of the form
constraint.each household faces a cash-in-advance
(4) N +r > Pc.
In the second period, there is an analogous budget constraint and
cash-in-advance constraint5
(5)M' >Pc'
where P' is the nominal price of goods in the second period.
The model involves an artificial "final period" problem common to finite
horizon monetary models. To deal with this problem, I assume that a
perfectly enforced law required people to work an exogenously determined L'
hours in the second period, and to sell the output for money.
Any attempt to obtain real effects of changes in the money supply must
rely on some real disturbance that is proximately associated with the
monetary change (to avoid real effects of a costless currency reform). One
natural candidate for a real change associated with a monetary change is a
wealth redistribution. Transfer payment financed by new money may not be
distributed in proportion to money balances; open market purchases
redistribute wealth from money-holders to people whose future tax liabilities
are reduced by the fall in government debt: expansion of bank reserves at a
below-market discount rate redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the
recipients of the subsidized loans. In order for these channels of' wealth
redistribution to operate, capital markets must be Incomplete (or costly to
trade in) since otherwise individuals could perfectly hedge against such
redistributions. The magnitudes of these wealth redistributions, however,
are small empirically and seem unable to account for the phenomena we want to
.5
explain.
5One reaction to the small magnitude of' the wealth redistribution caused
directly by a monetary expansion is to seek a more indirect relation.
Grossman, Hart, and Maskin (1983) argue that because a large fraction of
assets are held in the form of nominal debt, and because of these and other
nominal contracts, monetary changes can produce substantial wealth6
Even if monetary changes are associated with wealth redistributions,
additional elements of a model are required to explain changes in aggregate
output. If tastes are characterized by parallel linear income expansion
paths, then a wealth redistribution does not affect even relative prices.
Aggregate output may be unaffected even if shifts in relative supplies and
demands alter the composition of production. Real mobility costs of labor in
this situation could produce a temporary reduction in output and employment
in response to a change in the composition of demand. Alternatively, some
other explanation such as the asymmetry In optimal labor contracts when
workers and firms are differently informed, studied by Grossman, Hart. and
Maskin (1983). could be invoked to explain a temporary reduction in output
following a shift in the composition of demand.
An alternative channel for real changes associated with monetary
disturbances, which does not rely on wealth redistributions, has been
discussed by Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), and Krugman,
Persson. and Svensson (1982). If demand is constrained by liquidity, then
monetary disturbances that differentially affect individuals liquidity can
alter the composition of demand and supply. It seems plausible that effects
redistributions through changes in the price level. They do not, however,
explain the existence of these nominal contracts. King and Haubrich (1984)
assume that the variance of the distribution of wealth is positively
correlated with monetary growth, without specifying the mechanism leading to
this correlation (which could reflect an endogenous component of money
growth).7
of monetary disturbances on liquidity may be substantially larger than the
small direct effects on wealth distribution.6
Money supply changes will affect liquidity in this model, and the effects
will differ across households. Let there be two types of households, in
equal number, indexed by j and k. Type j households receive the transfer (or
the Grossman and Weiss paper and the Rotemberg papers, monetary
disturbances redistribute both liquidity and wealth. Individuals visit
financial markets at staggered intervals, as in Jovanovic's (.1981) steady
state general equilibrium extension of the Baumol-Tobin model, and an open
market purchase redistributes wealth from people not currently trading in
financial markets ("at the bank') to people who are doing so. The wealth
redistribution takes the form of (i) a greater inflation tax on the former
group, who currently hold more money than the latter group, and (ii) a change
in the time-path of the real interest rate (and capital, in Rotemberg's
model) which affects the groups differently because of their different time
paths of borrowing and lending. A redistribution of wealth, alone, may not
affect aggregate output, the price level, or real interest rates. But the
open market purchase also raises the price level and reduces the real money
balances of people not currently In financial markets. Since money is
required to buy consumption goods, this places a more severe liquidity
constraint on demand by the group. The group's current consumption falls by
more, as a result of this fall in liquidity, than it would if only wealth
were affected. The group with higher wealth (those at financial markets)
increases its consumption demand, but by less than the fall in demand by the
other group. The fall in aggregate consumption demand (given output, which
depends on the predetermined capital stock) leads to an increase in the
capital stock (in Rotemberg's model) and a fall in the real interest rate.
The price level initially rises less than proportionately to the money stock
because of the increased demand of money by the wealthier group (while the
less wealthy, liquidity constrained group exhausts its money holdings).
In Krugman, Persson, and Svensson (1982). an exogenous real disturbance
Increases the wealth of lucky consumers and decreases the wealth of unlucky
consumers. But lucky consumers are initially unable to increase their
consumption as much as they would If they were not liquidity constrained by
their (predetermined) cash balances. Unlucky consumers are not liquidity
constrained: they reduce consumption and hold some unspent cash balances. A
reduction In the rate of monetary expansion (through lump-sum transfers to
all Individuals, which cannot be used for current consumption) raises the
rate of return on money holding and so leads unlucky consumers to reduce
current purchases and save more money for future purchases. This reduction
in spending and associated increase in money demand lowers the current price
level and, therefore, makes the liquidity constraint on lucky consumers less
severe.8
pay the tax) r when the first period begins. Type k households do not
receive a transfer or pay a tax. Before the first period begins, it is
impossible to determine whether a household is of type j or type k.
Moreover, households are effectively able to conceal their type ex-post
(unless they choose behavior that reveals it).
Equilibrium in the second period is straightforward. Only (5) constrains
consumption, SO C1 =M'/P',where ij, k. But goods market equilibrium
in the second period implies








This period-two equilibrium makes assets other than money worthless in period
two, so a' =0.
Households choose c, L and M' to maximize (1) subject to (3)-(5) where
t =0for k households, so
(9) W1(l -L)=,a2L'P




LetL be the solution to
(11) LW1(l -L)=L'U1(L').
which in the case of (2) is








and note that MS =M(1 +
Suppose >o. >0.This is guaranteed by




whichin the case of (2) reduce to
(l3) [.i_]




Then 'i> 0, v> 0, L =L=Lgiven in (Ii'), consumption are
*










Note that the last two terms in (16) are exogenous, and that if the exogenous
second-period labor supply L' is set so that L' =L,then (11') implies L =
and(13') reduces to ((1 ÷w)/2to1)"> /3 which is satisfied for
/3 < I and sufficiently small t, i.e., for
(13") 2/3(l/r) -1< w < (213l/r -i)l.
Despite the liquidity contraints on households' consumption choices and
the differential effects on liquidity across households of a change in the
money supply, (15) implies that the price level is proportional to the money
supply. Relative consumption of type j versus type k households is altered
by changes in the money supply as shown by (14), but (11') shows that total11
output is independent of the money supply. This last result is specific to
the two-period example and would change if the horizon were longer. However,
the two-period example simplifies the results below on contracts.
III.Price-Contractswith Demand-Determined Output
The spot-market equilibrium is inefficient because households are unable
to pool the risk involved in the transfers. If this risk were partly—but
not fully—pooled, so that "lucky" households make a payment to "unlucky"
households, then the partial insurance arrangements through which these
payments are made could be interpreted as a non-neutral effect of money.
With imperfect insurance, lucky households will be net purchasers of goods
from unlucky households. Because the insurance involves payment from lucky
to unlucky households, this payment could be interpreted as part of the price
paid by lucky households for goods purchased from unlucky households. The
gross price—including these payments—would exceed the spot market price.
In the absence of insurance arrangements, households can be made better off
by alternative institutional arrangements. For example, suppose buyers and
sellers are bound by contracts that specify a priceP1 for the first N units
of the good that a household purchases, and a priceP2 >P1for subsequent
units. By appropriate choice of P1, P2, and N, one can achieve allocations
arbitrarily close to the full-insurance allocation. (Choose N to be the
full-insurance spot market price, and make P2 arbitrarily large. The
transfer payments—or unassessed taxes—then have arbitrarily small real
value.)12
In this paper, I restrict the set of potential contracts to fall within
the set in which (a) a price function q is unrelated to the amount a
household purchases, and (b) output is demand-determined. Denote output
under the contracts by X. The price q is a function of the money supply (and
other exogenous variables) and only this function q is to be chosen.
Households live in sets called "neighborhoods" In the (1, 2) interval. A
neighborhood is defined by a contract between households and the indentity of
the households involved. An "equal rights" law, enforced perfectly and
costless.ly by the government, requires all (Identical, except for
place-of-origin on the (0, 1) interval) households in a neighborhood to be
treated identically in the contract. Neighborhoods can be treated as sets of
points between adjacent rational numbers, so there are infinitely many
neighborhoods. An exogenous probability distribution assigns possible
contracts to neighborhoods on the (1, 2) interval. Households may move
costlessly between neighborhoods before the first period begins.
Within each neighborhood, households sell to one another. The contract
defining the neighborhood requires households to buy and sell at the
neighborhood price q(n), with sales determined by demand. Obviously, the
price must be equal in every neighborhood in which households choose to
locate. Moreover, households will choose to locate in the neighborhood(s)
with the highest expected utility per household.
Given the contract, each household in a neighborhood chooses c to
maximize
(1') U(c) +W(1-X)+IUf_(M+r + qX-qc)]+W(1
-L')
J:13
subjectto given X (to be determined below) and
(4) M +r>qc.
Lettingbe the multiplier on (4), c satisfies
2Lq F2L' 1 (17) U (c) = 3UI—(M +r+qx- +
MS IMS J
wherer =0for a k-household, as before.
Make the provisional assumption that >0, >0.(The conditions
that guarantee this are discussed below. )Then c3 = and =, so
q q
output under the contract is
(18) x =2M+r
2q
for each household. Expected utility under the contract is




where exogenous utility in the second period has been ignored. A change in
the contractual price affects expected utility by
(20) =M + -2M+r -
2M÷r)14
Evaluating (20) at the spot market price, q =P.and using (11) one

















which is positive if transfers are sufficiently small in absolute value.
because 3 < Soif r <1, <1,L =L,and is small, a contracturall
equilibrium with q <P(i.e., contract price smaller than the spot market
price would have been) and output demand-determined, dominates spot market
equilibrium in terms of expected utility. Note that, because output is
demand-determined under the contract, CL as q P.
r <1and 3 =Ithen (28) is zero for r =0and negative for all r 0.
(28) is minimized atsuch that
-r
=,
whichimplies r =0if O =1.15
Now consider the socially optimal q within this set of contracts.If
>0and >0then an optimum requires, using (20), that
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Because households can costiessly choose any neighborhood in the (1, 2)
interval in which to trade, they will choose the neighborhood with the
contractual price that most closely approximates (25).16
Now return to the provisional assumption that >0, >0.From (17),
this implies





is positive. At the optimal q given in (25), this implies





which is positive if and only if (13') is satisfied. Therefore, if transfers
are small enough to satIsfy (13") a contractual equilibrium with price q
given by (25) and demand-determined output,
(27) X =12F;•
yields higher expected utility than the spot market equilibrium with (14),
(15), and (11).17
While the spot market equilibrium price P is unit elastic in the money
supply, the contractual price q in (26) is not. The elasticity of q with
respect to the money supply, M5 =2M#r,for given initial money M, is8
1-r -r
(28) (q, M5) (r +R)1 1+R-(1-r) 1—
÷Wr1
which equals unity only at w =1,i.e., when r =0.If r <1and w >1(or
r >1 and <I)then (29) exceeds unity, while if r <1and w <1(or r >1
and >1)(28) is less that one. In fact, if r <1,
(29) =2r31 L,R k (r±R(1+R) (1) (1lr)r÷R
takes a minimum value at t= 1.So if the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is less than one, contractual prices are "sticky' in a downward
direction but rise with a greater than unit elasticity with an increase in
the money supply. Changes in the money supply raise the ratio of the
contract price to the spot market price (that would prevail without
8Given M, dlnMS =dln(l÷w),





d ln(1÷w )I1+w —r
But =i I(1-r)w ,so(28) follows.
d ln(1÷w) I 1-r
11-s.)18
contracts) and thereby reduce output. Notice that if 1and L' is chosen
* 1/(r+R) so that L =L'as in (11'), then (29) reduces to C1,so q <Pand
output under contracts exceeds spot market equilibrium output.
The relation between the contractual price and the money supply, for
small changes in the money supply, is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of
relative risk aversion less than one. The price falls less than
proportionately with decreases in the money supply and rises more than
proportionately with increases in the money supply. This price behavior with
demand-determined output provides a second-best insurance arrangement. This
Insurance works in the following way. Consider a fall in the money supply
through lump-sun taxes paid by type-i households. Because type-j households
lose wealth, their desired expenditure falls; because they are
liquidity-contrained, desired expenditure falls by the full amount of the
fall in liquidity, i.e., by the full amount of the increase in taxes.
Suppose the reduction in the money supply is x%; coniecture (falsely) that
nominal prices also fall by x%. In that case, type-i households reduce
expenditure by x% (their nominal money balances fall by 2x% while nominal
money holdings of other households are unaffected). The assumption that
transfer payments are small in absolute value implies that type-k households,
who gain x% in real money balances due to the fall in prices, remain
liquidity constrained. The purpose of this assumption is to simplify the
example by ensuring that type-k households increase current expenditures by
the full x%. If nominal prices fall by less than x%, then type-i households
lose more than x% on their real balances: their nominal balances fall by 2x%
and prices fall by less than x%; similarly, type-k households would gain less19
than x on their real balances. Because all money is spent in this
liquidity-contrained example, these losses in real balances are losses in
consumption. If prices fall by (x -e),for 0 <e<x,rather than x, then
coinaredtothecase which prices fallpx,type-ihousehold consume e9
lessand type-k households consume e less. Because type-k households
consume more then type-i households (who paid the tax), the absolute fall in
consumption by type k households is larger than that of type-j households.
If the degree of relative risk aversion is less than one, type-k households
lose more utility than do type-j households from lower consumption. But if
consumption is lower, because real balances are lower, then production (which
is demand-determined) will also be lower. Lower production implies less
labor supply and more leisure. Because all households work the same amount.
they all gain the same amount of utility from additional leisure. On net,
then, utility Is redistributed from 'lucky' type-k households who did not
have to pay the tax to "unlucky" type-j households who paid the tax. Prices
fall less than proportionately with money and output falls.
Similarly, if the money supply increases by x% through transfers to
type-i households (that increase their money holdings by 2x), nominal prices
rise by more than x. Starting from a situation in which nominal prices have
risen by x%, further increases in prices reduce real balances and consumption
by all households, With the degree of relative risk aversion smaller than
one, this reduces utility of the "lucky" type-i households more than it
reduces utility of "unlucky" type-k households. But all households gain
equal utility from the reduction in labor supply that accompanies the fall in
real balances and consumption demand, Consequently, a rise in nominal prices20
that Is greater in percentage terms than the increase in the money supply
redistributes utility from the lucky to the unlucky households. With
relative risk aversion less than one, nominal prices exhibit some downward
(but not upward) stickiness, and, as in Grossman. Hart, and Maskin (1983),
changes in the money supply reduce output.
The level of nominal prices reflects the fact that there are two
distortions in the model. First, as long as the rate of inflation exceeds
the negative of the discount rate, real money balances fall short of
Friedman's optimal quantity of money. As In Aschauer (1981). this takes the
form of suboptimal labor supply and output in equilibrium. Second,
uncertainty about the identity of taxpayers or transfer recipients creates
risk that would be diversifiable if capital markets were complete. The levei
of contractual prices is lower, when the tax/transfer is zero and the degree
of relative risk aversion less than one, than the level of prices in the spot
market equilibrium. Because output is demand determined, this raises output
above its spot market equilibrium value and offsets the first distortion.
The optimal contract sets prices so that real money balances are lower if the
tax or transfer is nonzero; this is required for the partial insurance
arrangement that tends to offset the second distortion.9
9KIng and Haubrich (1984) develop a rather different model in which price
contracts play an insurance role. In simplified form, their model has two
kinds of individuals, A and B.The distortion of wealth across B-people is
random and unobservable (or at least uninsurable) while the variance of this
distribution is random and observable (perhaps with error). People in group
A sell insurance to people in group B against the contingency of a high
variance, If the variance turns out to be low, B pays A an insurance premium
while If the variance turns out to high, B collects an insurance payment from
A.In the latter situation, A is less wealthy than otherwise. King and
Haubrich assume people in group A have variable labor supply while those in B
do not (they are retired), so the fall in A's wealth leads to an increase in21
IV. Conclusions
The paper has presented an example of an economy in which incomplete
asset markets create incentives for buyers and sellers to sign contracts that
specify a price function different from the spot market equilibrium price
function. The price function can exhibit downward stickiness in nominal
prices and lead to nonneutral effects of money on real output. Three key
elements of the model are the transactions role of money, fluctuations that
differ across households in the value of nominal money balances, and the
inability of households to insure directly.
As in Grossman and Weiss (1983), a change in the money supply in either
direction not only redistributes wealth but affects the liquidity of some
consumers. The inability of households to diversify the risk of money supply
changes creates a role for contracts with nonneutral effects of money.
The model is not developed from first principles. Instead, it seeks to
take one step toward that end starting from macroeconomic models that
postulate sticky prices. Usually, sticky prices are a source of Inefficiency
in a model, and monetary disturbances have real effects because of this
inefficiency. Ordinarily, households would prefer to be able to adjust
labor supply and output. Given a fixed velocity of money, this reduces the
price level. They also assume that the variance of the wealth distribution
is positively correlated with monetary growth (which is neutral if the
variance is fixed). States of the world with high money growth are
associated, therefore, with high output and with prices that rise less than
proportionately to money. A fall In the money supply is associated with a
smaller variance of the wealth distribution in group B and with higher wealth
for A people, so output is lower and prices fall by less than the money
supply.22
prices instantaneously in those models, and price stickiness must be
rationalized—usually implicitly—on the ground that changing prices has some
cost. The example in this paper, in contrast, begins with an Inefficiency
due to incomplete asset markets and the nature of monetary disturbances.
Households can increase expected utility by entering into contracts in whlih
nominal prices are somewhat sticky in a downward direction and output is
demand-determined. Further research will be required to develop the ideas in
this example further, to include an explanation based on first principles for
the absence of an explicit insurance market in the risk caused by taxes and
transfers, and to consider a broader range of possible contracts and
alternative choices for households. The goal of this paper has been much
more modest—to develop a specific example in which households would have an
incentive to enter into trades with sticky nominal prices and in which real
output is affected by monetary disturbances.23
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